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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH and
GRETTA JOYCE HEIDLEBAUGH,
Husband and Wife,

*
*
*
*

(Plaintiffs) Appellants,
vs.

*
*
*

LEROY WEBB, PAUL NELSON and
CLINTON CITY,

*
*
*
(Defendants) Respondents. *

Case No. 88-0400
Case No. 890071-CA

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to the Utah Supreme Court's Order dated February 2, 1989, and
also pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (1988).

The

ruling appealed from is a Final Order of Dismissal entered by
the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on December 26, 1988, in the
Second Judicial District in and for Davis County, State of Utah,

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues on appeal which pertain to respondents
Leroy Webb, Paul Nelson and Clinton City are:
1.

Whether the district court properly dismissed

appellants1 Robert and Gretta Heidlebaugh's instant action
on the basis that the dismissal of a prior action was an

involuntary dismissal granted under the authority of Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 41(b).
2.

Whether the trial judge properly acted within

the range of his discretion in involuntarily dismissing the
Heidlebaughs' first action for their failure to appear at
scheduled depositions.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The above-captioned lawsuit is a civil rights action
against Clinton City, its chief of police, Leroy Webb,
and one of its detectives, Paul Nelson.

Appellants Robert

Heidlebaugh and Gretta Joyce Heidlebaugh filed a prior
identical Complaint in September, 1985.
Clinton City's counsel attempted repeatedly in that
first action to take the Heidlebaughs1 depositions.

After

Robert Heidlebaugh did not appear for a continued scheduled
deposition, Clinton City's counsel filed a Motion to Compel
the Heidlebaughs1 appearance at depositions or in the
alternative, to have their action dismissed.

The Motion was

set for hearing, but prior to the hearing, counsel agreed that
the Motion would be stricken and no sanctions sought, if, in
return, the Heidlebaughs appeared at a set time for a
deposition.

Counsel further agreed that if the Heidlebaughs

did not appear, that as a sanction, the Court would enter an
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Order of Dismissal.

A written Stipulation to that effect was

submitted to the Court.

When the Heidlebaughs failed to appear

for their scheduled depositions, the Court imposed the
agreed-to sanctions, and dismissed the Heidlebaughs1
Complaint.

The Court's Order, however, did not expressly state

whether the dismissal was "with prejudice" or "without
prejudice."
On February 10, 1988, the Heidlebaughs filed a second
action against the same Clinton City defendants on the basis
of allegations identical to those made in the first action.
The district court dismissed the second action on the basis
that the first action was dismissed for cause, due to the
Heidlebaughs1 failure to appear for depositions, and was
therefore an adjudication upon the merits.

Judge Cornaby

concluded that the Heidlebaughs were barred from bringing this
second action.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This civil rights action was originally filed by
Robert and Gretta Heidlebaugh on or about November 22,
1985.

(R. at 2-3, 7, 16, 71.)

In that first action,

Clinton City's counsel, Robert G. Gilchrist, after a
discussion with the Heidlebaughs1 then counsel of record,
John Caine, set the deposition of Robert Heidlebaugh for
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10:00 a.m. on August 13, 1986.

(R. at 22.)

That deposition

was later rescheduled for August 12, 1986, pursuant to the
request of appellants1 counsel, John Caine.

(R. at 22.)

On August 11, 1986, Mr. Caine again contacted
Robert G. Gilchrist, and indicated that he could not locate his
clients and therefore the deposition had to be continued.
at 22.)

(R.

A second Amended Notice of Deposition was filed for

the deposition of Robert Heidlebaugh to be taken at 10:00
a,aw on September 9, 1986.

(R. at 22, 68 & 71.)

On

September 9, 1986, Robert Heidlebaugh failed to appear for
his deposition.

(R. at 68, 71.)

On September 23, 1986,

Robert G. Gilchrist, after being unable to contact the
Heidlebaughs' counsel of record by telephone, sent a letter to
Mr. Caine again requesting that he produce his clients for a
deposition.

(R. at 22.)

Thereafter, on November 4, 1986,

Clinton City's counsel moved the district court to compel the
Heidlebaughs to appear for their depositions or, in the
alternative, to dismiss their action.

(R. at 13, 21-23, 68,

71.)
Clinton City's Motion to Compel was set for hearing
on December 16, 1986.

(R. at 13.)

Prior to the time of

hearing, the parties, by and through their counsel of record,
entered into a written stipulation which stated that if the
Heidlebaughs did not appear for their depositions on January 5,
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1987, that the Court would dismiss their Complaint.
27-29, 68, 71.)

Robert and Gretta Heidlebaugh both failed

to appear for their depositions on January 5, 1987.
32-33, 68, 71.)

(R. at 13,

(R. at 14,

On February 10, 1987, the Court entered an

Order of Dismissal.

The Order did not specify whether the

dismissal was with prejudice or without prejudice.

(R. at 14,

32-33, 68-69, 71.)
On February 10, 1988, the Heidlebaughs, relying on
the savings statute, filed a new Complaint against the same
Clinton City defendants on the basis of identical allegations
as those made in the first action.

(R. at 1-3, 12-13.)

On

September 26, 1988, Judge Cornaby entered an Order dismissing
the Heidlebaughs' second action.

Judge Cornaby's Ruling

stated that the dismissal of the first action was granted
because Robert Heidlebaugh did not make himself available for
a deposition, and therefore, the Complaint was dismissed for
cause, and constituted an adjudication upon the merits.
Court further held that due to the adjudication upon the
merits, the Heidlebaughs could not rely upon the savings
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953) to file their
second action.

(R. at 68-72.)
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The

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The central question posed by the Heidlebaughs'
appeal is whether the trial court properly determined that
the dismissal of the original action was an involuntary
dismissal and an adjudication on the merits pursuant to Rule
41(b), Utah R. Civ. P.

It is well established that under

Rule 41(b), that the defendant may obtain an involuntary
dismissal of an action for a plaintiff's failure to prosecute
or to comply with any Rule of Civil Procedure, or any court
order.

In the first action filed by the Heidlebaughs,

Clinton City's counsel repeatedly attempted to take the
Heidlebaughs' depositions.

The depositions were scheduled and

rescheduled upon the request of the Heidlebaughs' prior
counsel.

When Robert Heidlebaugh failed to appear at his

scheduled deposition on September 9, 1986, Clinton City's
counsel moved the Court for an Order compelling the
Heidlebaughs to appear for the depositions, or in the
alternative to have their action dismissed.

Clinton City's

motion forced the Heidlebaughs' prior counsel, John Caine, to
agree to the sanction of dismissal if the Heidlebaughs did not
appear at the next scheduled deposition.

Upon the

Heidlebaughs' subsequent failure to appear for their
depositions, Judge Douglas Cornaby entered an Order of
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Dismissal.

Although the Order did not specify whether the

dismissal was with or without prejudice, Judge Cornaby's
Ruling on Clinton City's Motion to Dismiss the Heidlebaughsf
second action stated that the dismissal of the first action was
a sanction imposed for Robert Heidlebaughs1 failure to make
himself available for depositions.

Therefore the Heidlebaughs1

first action was dismissed involuntarily under Utah R. Civ.
P., Rule 41(b) for their failure to comply with the rules
regarding discovery.

A dismissal under Rule 41(b) is an

adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise stated in the
order of dismissal.
The Heidlebaughs argued that since their prior
counsel stipulated to a dismissal, that the Court's Order of
Dismissal was a voluntary dismissal under Utah R. Civ. P.,
Rule 41(a).

Thus, the Heidlebaughs contend that the dismissal

of the first action was without prejudice.

However, a party

cannot convert a motion for an involuntary dismissal to a
voluntary dismissal merely by stipulating to the dismissal.
The Heidlebaughs did not "voluntarily" decide to seek
dismissal.

Their failure to comply with discovery and

Clinton City's Motion to Compel forced the Heidlebaughs'
prior counsel to enter into the stipulation.

The mere fact

that the Heidlebaughs1 prior counsel agreed to such sanction
does not convert an involuntary dismissal into a voluntary one.
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A dismissal for a plaintiff's failure to comply with
the Rules of Civil Procedure is a matter resting within the
sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed on
appeal only for an abuse of such discretion.

The trial court's

determination is entitled to considerable weight on appeal,
since the trial court is in the best position to assess the
efforts of the plaintiff to accomplish compliance with the
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Similarly, determination of the

appropriate discovery sanction is largely within the discretion
of the trial court, and may be reversed only for abuse of that
discretion.

In this case the trial judge determined that the

Heidlebaughs' repeated failures to appear at depositions was
sufficient dilatory conduct that required the sanction of
dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

As such, the dismissal of the first action was a

dismissal on the merits barring the Heidlebaughs' second action
under the doctrine of res judicata.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSED THIS ACTION BECAUSE OF
THE HEIDLEBAUGHS' FAILURE TO APPEAR FOR DEPOSITIONS,
WHICH CONSTITUTED AN INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE UNDER RULE 41(b) OF THE UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
This matter involves two separate, subsequent civil
actions.

Judge Douglas Cornaby of the Second District
-8-

Court dismissed the first action, but his Order did not specify
whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice.
Therefore, the key question is whether Judge Cornaby properly
determined that the dismissal of the first action was an
involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, rather than a voluntary dismissal under
Rule 41(a).
Rules 41(a) and (b), Utah R. Civ. P. provide in
pertinent part:
(a)

Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation.
Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(c), Rule 66, and of any applicable
statute, an action may be dismissed by
the plaintiff without order of court
. . . (ii) by filing a stipulation of
dismissal signed by all parties who
have appeared in the action. Unless
otherwise stated in the notice of
dismissal or stipulation, the
dismissal is without prejudice . . .
(2) By order of court. Except as
provided in paragraph (1) of the
subdivision of this rule, an action
shall not be dismissed at the
plaintiff's instance save upon order
of the court and upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems
proper. . . Unless otherwise
specified in the order, a dismissal
under this paragraph is without
prejudice.

(b)

Involuntary dismissal; effect
thereof. For failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute or to comply
with these rules or any order of
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court, a defendant may move for the
dismissal of an action or of any claim
against him. . . . Unless the court
in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not
provided for under this rule, other
than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction or for improper venue or
for lack of an indispensable party,
operates as an adjudication upon the
merits. (Emphasis added).
Therefore, if the trial court properly dismissed the first
action pursuant to Rule 41(b), the dismissal is an adjudication
upon the merits, and the Heidlebaughs are barred from further
action against the Clinton City defendants.

If, on the other

hand the dismissal was granted under the authority of Rule
41(a), the dismissal was without prejudice.
In the first action, Clinton City's counsel made
several attempts to schedule the Heidlebaughs1 depositions.
Upon the request of the Heidlebaughs1 prior counsel, John
Caine, Clinton City's counsel, Robert G. Gilchrist, twice
agreed to reschedule the deposition of Robert Heidlebaugh.
Finally, a deposition was scheduled for September 9, 1986.
However Mr* Heidlebaugh failed to appear for this
deposition.

Thereafter, Mr. Gilchrist attempted to contact Mr.

Caine, first by telephone, and then by letter requesting that
he produce his clients for a deposition.

On November 4, 1986,

Mr. Gilchrist moved the district court to compel the
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Heidlebaughs to appear for their depositions or, in the
alternative, to dismiss their Complaint.
Immediately prior to the hearing on Clinton City's
motion, Attorney John Caine stated that he would guarantee
his clients' appearance at a set time for depositions if
Mr. Gilchrist would agree not to pursue the hearing on his
Motion and seek monetary sanctions against the Heidlebaughs.
Mr. Caine further agreed that if his clients did not appear
for the next scheduled depositions, that as a sanction the
Court would enter an Order of Dismissal.

Although

Mr. Gilchrist could have requested the monetary sanctions at
the hearing on his motion, in the interests of saving time and
expense, he agreed to Mr. Caine's proposal and a stipulation
was filed with the Court.
The Stipulation provided:
The plaintiffs . . . and defendants . . .
hereby stipulate and agree that based upon
the plaintiffs' attorney (sic)
representation that he has located his
clients, it is hereby stipulated that he
will produce them for their depositions at
his office on January 5, 1987, and if the
plaintiffs fail to appear at that time and
place, that the plaintiffs agree that the
Court will dismiss their Complaint filed
herein.
(R. at 27.)
When the Heidlebaughs once again failed to appear for
the scheduled depositions, Judge Cornaby entered an Order
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dismissing the Heidlebaughs1 first action.

The Order of

Dismissal stated as follows:
Based upon the previously submitted
stipulation of counsel that the plaintiffs
would appear for their depositions at 10:00
a.m. on January 5, 1987, the defendants1
counsel of record, having submitted a
notice of said depositions, and it being
represented to the Court that the
plaintiffs did not appear at the
above-stated time and place, and that based
upon the foregoing stipulation that this
matter would be dismissed,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's
Complaint is hereby dismissed.
(R. at 32-33.)
On February 10, 1988, exactly one year after Judge
Cornaby's Order dismissing the first action, the Heidlebaughs
filed a second action against the same defendants and on the
basis of identical allegations as those made in the first
action.

The Heidlebaughs relied on the Utah savings statute,

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953), which provides that if any
action is commenced within due time, and if the plaintiff fails
in such action otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff
may commence a new action within one year after the failure.
The Heidlebaughs further relied upon Rule 41(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure in arguing that an Order of Dismissal
based upon a stipulation of the parties is without prejudice,
and therefore not upon the merits.
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In May of 1988, Clinton City's counsel moved the
Court to dismiss the Heidlebaughs' second action on the grounds
that the first action was dismissed involuntarily and therefore
was with prejudice and on the merits.

The Court's Ruling on

the Motion to Dismiss filed August 8, 1988, stated:
In that [first] action, the defendants
notified the plaintiffs on June 17, 1986,
that the deposition of Robert Heidlebaugh
would be taken on August 13, 1986. This
was continued to September 9, 1986. The
plaintiffs' attorney could not produce his
client for a deposition. . . . The
plaintiffs' attorney stipulated to the
dismissal only because he could not
produce his client for a deposition, even
though he had from June 1986 to
January 1987 to do so. The dismissal was
granted because the plaintiff would not
make himself available for a deposition.
This was a dismissal"~for cause. It
operated as "an adjudication upon the
merits."
Under the view stated above, the plaintiffs
are not entitled to the benefits of Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-40, which is the saving
statute. (Emphasis added.)
(R. at 68-69.)

Thereafter, on September 26, 1988, Judge

Cornaby entered an Order dismissing the Heidlebaughs' second
action on the grounds of res judicata.

(R. at 70-72.)

The trial court properly dismissed the Heidlebaughs'
first action under Rule 41(b), based upon appellants' failure
to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding
discovery.

Several courts have upheld the sanction of

dismissal where a plaintiff has failed to comply with a
-13-

discovery rule or with a court order regarding discovery.
Since Utah has adopted Rule 41 of the Fed. R. Civ. P.,
federal cases applying Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 41 are
illustrative in the present case. Madsen v. Borthick, 97
Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 18 n. 4 (12/12/88).
In Carter v. McGowan, 524 F.Supp. 1119 (D. Nev.
1981), the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada dismissed the plaintiff's second action on the grounds
of res judicata.

During the course of discovery of the

first action, the defendants submitted a notice to take the
plaintiff's deposition on July, 1980.

Defendants' attorney was

later advised that the plaintiff was in jail in Salt Lake
City.

Defendants' attorney wrote to the plaintiff and inquired

as to his availability for the taking of his deposition.

By

letter, plaintiff responded that he hoped to be free in
October, and would contact defendants' attorney when he was
able to proceed with the deposition.

On September 25, 1980,

the defendants' attorney mailed to the plaintiff at his Salt
Lake City mailing address, notice of his deposition to be taken
on December 3, 1980. The plaintiff did not appear for that
deposition, nor did he contact the attorney.

524 F.Supp. at

1120.
Thereafter, defendants' attorney moved to dismiss the
action as a sanction provided by Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 37,
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for the plaintiff's failure to appear for his deposition.
court granted defendants' motion to dismiss.

The

On June 10, 1981,

plaintiff filed his second action against the defendants,
arguing that he was incarcerated until January 28, 1981, and
that he did not receive the notice of deposition.
The Nevada Court held that the first action was
dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) for the plaintiff's failure to
comply with the rules of civil procedure.

The Court

disregarded plaintiff's excuses that he was incarcerated at the
time of the deposition, and that he had never received the
Notice of Deposition.

According to the Carter Court, a

dismissal on the grounds of failure to comply with the rules of
civil procedure bars a subsequent action, unless the court
otherwise specifies.
Similarly, in the case of Nasser v. Isthmian
Lines, 331 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1964), the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's second action on the grounds of res judicata.
In that case, after the defendant had answered and the
plaintiff's deposition had been taken, the defendant sent
written interrogatories to the plaintiff's attorney.

The

plaintiff failed to meet the deadline in answering the
defendant's written interrogatories.

Thereafter the court

granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to answer
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the interrogatories.

The plaintiff subsequently brought a

second action against the defendants.

However, the district

court awarded summary judgment to the defendant on the grounds
of res judicata.
On appeal the plaintiff argued that a dismissal for
failing to answer interrogatories was a drastic sanction,
unless there was evidence of the plaintiff's willfulness.

The

second circuit court held that the questions going to the
propriety of the dismissal of the first action, and the
willfulness of the plaintiff's default, were now foreclosed and
the judgment below must be affirmed.

331 F.2d at 126-127. The

Nasser Court cited Costello v. United States, 3 65 U.S.
265 (1961), a factually dissimilar case, for the proposition
that a dismissal for failure to comply with the rules of civil
procedure regarding discovery is subject to the provisions of
Rule 41(b) and is an adjudication upon the merits unless the
court otherwise specifies.

Id. at 127, 129.

See also

Hubbard v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 249 F.2d 886 (6th
Cir. 1957) (where plaintiff's original suit is dismissed for
failure to attend the taking of his deposition, such dismissal
constitutes a judgment upon the merits, is res judicata and
becomes an effective bar to any subsequent action); Paxton
v. State, 21 Hawaii App. 46, 625 P.2d 1052 (Hawaii 1981) (the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
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plaintiff's action for failure to timely answer defendant's
interrogatories); Chira v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp,, 634
F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1980) (court upheld the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiff's action for failure to comply with
the court's order requiring that all discovery be completed
within six months).
The above authorities indicate that the trial court
may properly dismiss an action under Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure 41(b) for plaintiff's failure to comply with the
discovery rules.

In the present case, Judge Cornaby properly

dismissed the Heidlebaughs' first action for their repeated
failure to make themselves available for depositions.

Since

the Order of Dismissal did not state that the dismissal was
without prejudice, Rule 41(b) dictates that the dismissal
constituted an adjudication upon the merits.

Therefore the

Heidelbaughs were barred from further action against
Clinton City, and their second action was properly dismissed
under the doctrine of res judicata.
The Heidlebaughs contend that because Attorney John
Caine stipulated to the sanction of dismissal, the Court's
order dismissing their first action was a voluntary dismissal
under Rule 41(a), and was therefore a dismissal without
prejudice.

However a party to an action cannot convert a

motion under Rule 41(b) of the rules of civil procedure into an
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agreement to dismiss under Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) by consenting to a
dismissal, unless all parties consent to that particular type
of dismissal.

Wight v, United Pacific Ins, Co., 154 F.Supp

548, 551 (D. Utah 1957).

The Heidlebaughs contend that if

41(a)(1)(ii) regarding stipulations is not applicable to this
case, then 41(a)(2) applies.

That subpart states that at a

plaintiff's instance an action may be dismissed by court order,
and unless otherwise specified in the order, such dismissal is
a dismissal without prejudice.

However the Heidlebaughs*

reliance upon any subdivisions of Rule 41(a) is unfounded since
the dismissal of the first action was not "voluntarily" agreed
to by the Heidlebaughs and their prior counsel.
The term "voluntary" in Rule 41 means that the party
is filing the dismissal without being compelled to do so by
another party or by the court.

Randall v. Merrill-Lynch,

820 F.2d 1317, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 108
S. Ct. 753.

The Heidlebaughs did not voluntarily decide to

drop their first action, but instead were forced to dismiss it
when they failed to comply with the rules of discovery by
failing to appear for their depositions.

The Heidlebaughs1

prior counsel, John Caine, never indicated to Clinton
City's counsel, Robert Gilchrist, that the Heidlebaughs had
decided to drop their suit.

Instead, he agreed that they would

be subject to the sanction of dismissal if they did not appear
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for a deposition.

As stated in the Court's Ruling on Clinton

City's Motion to Dismiss the second action, the only reason Mr.
Caine stipulated to the dismissal was because he could not
produce his clients for depositions.
Mr. Caine was compelled to sign the stipulation
because of Clinton City's motion to compel.

Therefore the

Heidlebaughs may not rely on any subdivisions of Rule 41(a).
As Judge Cornaby stated in his Ruling the dismissal of the
first action was a sanction imposed for the Heidlebaughs'
repeated failure to appear at depositions, and was properly
granted under the authority of Rule 41(b).

Pursuant to Rule

41(b), the dismissal of the first action was thus on the merits
and with prejudice.

The Heidlebaughs' second action was

therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata and was
properly dismissed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL JUDGE HAS BROAD DISCRETION
IN DETERMINING APPROPRIATE DISCOVERY
SANCTIONS AND IN GRANTING AN INVOLUNTARY
DISMISSAL, AND SUCH DISMISSALS SHOULD ONLY
BE REVERSED ON APPEAL FOR AN ABUSE OF THAT DISCRETION
A trial judge has broad discretion in determining
whether to grant a dismissal for violations of discovery
rules or for violations of a court order regarding discovery.
The choice of an appropriate discovery sanction is primarily
the responsibility of the trial judge and will not be reversed
-19-

absent an abuse of discretion.

First Federal Savings & Loan

Assoc, v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984).
Sanctions for refusal to comply with a court order or for
failing to respond to discovery requests are within the court's
discretion.

A discretionary determination may be reviewed only

in the case of a gross, clear, plain, palpable, or manifest
abuse of discretion.

GM Leasing Corp. v. Murray First

Thrift & Loan Co., 534 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Utah 1975).

Generally

the trial court is vested with wide discretion in matters of
discovery and its decision will not be disturbed except where
there is abuse of discretion.

Rogers v. Fenton, 115 Ariz.

217, 564 P.2d 906, 907 (1977).
The Court's power under Rule 41(b) to enter a
dismissal based on a failure to prosecute or to obey a court
order or federal rule is an inherent aspect of its authority to
enforce its orders and insure prompt disposition of lawsuits.
Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir.
1985).

The standard of review on appeal from a dismissal of a

lawsuit is abuse of discretion.

Dynes v. Army Air Force

Exchange Service, 720 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1983).
Therefore although the Heidlebaughs are correct in stating that
the remedy of dismissal should be granted only in extreme
cases, the trial court clearly has broad discretion in
determining when to grant such a sanction.
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There is no evidence of a "gross," "clear," "plain,"
"palpable," or "manifest" abuse of discretion in the present
case.

The Heidlebaughs do not dispute the fact that Clinton

City's counsel made several unsuccessful attempts to take the
Heidlebaughs1 depositions.

The Heidlebaughs do not dispute

that the depositions were rescheduled several times upon their
prior counsel's requests, nor do they dispute that Robert
Keidlebaugh failed to appear for two separate depositions.
Such repeated failures to comply with discovery are sufficient
cause for which a court may properly grant a dismissal upon the
merits.

Carter v. McGowan, supra; Nasser v. Isthmian

Lines, supra; Hubbard v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.,
supra; Durgin v. Graham, 372 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir.
1967), cert, denied, 388 U.S. 919 (1967) (Although the
sanction of dismissal is the most severe sanction that a court
may apply, where plaintiffs did not once appear for the taking
of depositions and did not give an indication that they
intended to appear in the future, it is clear beyond any
question that the district court properly granted an Order of
Dismissal).
The Heidlebaughs argue that where a dismissal comes
about by reason of the attorney's fault, a dismissal without
prejudice is a drastic sanction imposed upon the client.
However, it is generally held that a party is bound by the
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actions of his lawyer.

In the case of Link v. Wabash R.R.

Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962), the Supreme Court stated:
There is certainly no merit to the
contention that dismissal of petitioner's
claim because of its counsel's unexcused
conduct imposes an unjust penalty on his
client. Petitioner voluntarily chose his
attorney as his representative in the
action, and he cannot now avoid the
consequences of the acts or omissions of
this freely selected agent.
Id. at 633-34.

See also Corchado v. Puerto Rico

Marine Mgmt., Inc., 665 F.2d 410, 413 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert, denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982); Chira, 634 F.2d at
666-667; Nasser, 331 F.2d at 129.
Because an involuntary dismissal of the Heidlebaughs1
first action was within the discretion of the trial court and
because the Heidlebaughs have failed to show any evidence of a
gross, clear, or manifest abuse of that discretion, the trial
court properly dismissed the Heidlebaughs' first action
pursuant to Rule 41(b).

A dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b),

unless otherwise stated in the Court's order, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.

In the present case since Judge

Cornaby's Order did not state that the dismissal was without
prejudice, the dismissal was on the merits and the Heidlebaughs
are bound by that adjudication.

Therefore the second action

they instituted against the Clinton City defendants was
properly dismissed on the grounds of res judicata.
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CONCLUSION
In the Heidlebaughs' first action, Clinton City's
counsel repeatedly attempted to take the Heidlebaughs'
depositions.

John Caine, the Heidlebaughs' prior counsel,

was unable to produce the Heidlebaughs, therefore, the
depositions were rescheduled twice.

Thereafter, Robert

Heidlebaugh failed to appear for his deposition.

Upon

Clinton City counsel's motion to compel discovery or in the
alternative to dismiss the action, a stipulation was entered
wherein Mr. Caine guaranteed his clients' appearance at the
next scheduled deposition.

When the Heidlebaughs failed to

appear for their scheduled depositions, the trial court
dismissed the Heidlebaughs' action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to comply with
the agreed to discovery request.

Pursuant to that rule

dismissal of the Heidlebaughs' action is an adjudication upon
the merits and is final.

Such a dismissal was clearly within

the broad discretion of the trial court and may not be reversed
absent a clear abuse of the judge's discretion.

Therefore the

same trial court properly dismissed the Heidlebaughs' second
action against the Clinton City defendants on the grounds of
res judicata.
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Respectfully submitted this Q^i*

day of March, 1989

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

^IVCUUJJJ^ .(L

rist
f\
Robert G. Gilchrist
Masuda A. Medcalf
1€
1/
Attorneys for Respondents

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that true and correct copies of the
foregoing instrument were mailed, first class, postage prepaid
on this c^f

day of March, 1989, to the following counsel of

record:

Peter C. Collins
WINDER & HASLAM
Suite 4004
175 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellants

UYJ&JUJL^
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EXHIBIT "A"

GARY D. STOTT
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH and GRETTA
JOYCE HEIDLEBAUGH, husband
and wife,

STIPULATION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,

vs.
LEROY WEBB, PAUL NELSON and
CLINTON CITY,

Civil No.: 38432

Defendants.

The plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of
record, John Caine and defendants, by and through their
counsel of record Robert G. Gilchrist, hereby stipulate and
agree that based upon the plaintiffs' attorney representation
that he has located his clients, it is hereby stipulated that
he will- produce them for their depositions at his office on
January 5, 1987, and if the plaintiffs fail to appear at that
time and place that the plaintiffs agree that the court will
dismiss their complaint filed herein.

DATED this

day of

, 1986.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

ROBERT G. GILCHRIST
Attorneys for Defendants
RICHARDS, CAINE AND RICHARDS

JOHN T. CAINE
Attorney for Plaintiffs

2-

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing stipulation of counsel,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that plaintiffs will appear at
their attorneys' office on January 5, 1987, at 10:00 a.m. for
their depositions, and if they fail to appear at that time that
upon notice to the court, that this matter will be dismissed.
DATED this

day of

, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS J. C0RNA3Y
District Court Judge
HEIDLEB2/RGG
JW12176
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EXHIBIT

"B"

GARY D. STOTT
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH and GRETTA
JOYCE HEIDLEBAUGH, husband
and wife,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
LEROY WEBB, PAUL NELSON and
CLINTON CITY,

C i v i l No.:

38432

Defendants.

Based upon the previously submitted stipulation of
counsel that the p l a i n t i f f s would appear for their depositions
at 10:00 a.m. on January 5, 1987, and the defendants' counsel
of record having submitted a notice of said depositions, and
i t being represented to the court that the p l a i n t i f f s did not
appear at the above stated time and place, that based upon the
foregoing s t i p u l a t i o n that t h i s matter would be dismissed,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the p l a i n t i f f s ' complaint
i s hereby dismissed.

DATED t h i s

lQ

day o f

ftbr\U(.n/

, 1987.

BY THE COURT:
OOUGLA? "-CORNABY
DISTRICT JUDGE

THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS J . CORNABY
D i s t r i c t Court Judge
Approved? a s t o Form:
//

Attorney for

Plaintiffs

\ROBEjRT G. GILCHRIST
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendants
HEIDLEB3/RGG
JW157
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EXHIBIT

"C"

In the Second Judicial District Court
in and for the

County of Davisr State of Utah

ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
RULING ON MOTION
TO DISMISS

vs.
LEROY WEBB, et al.,

Civil No. 42977

Defendants.

The defendants' motion to dismiss came before the court for
oral argument on August 2, 1988, with Peter C. Collins appearing
for the plaintiff-* and Robert G. Gilchrist appearing for the
defendants. After oral argument, the court took the motion under
advisement. The court now rules on the motion.
The motion to dismiss is granted.
The issue before this court is whether or not the prior
action is res judicatta.
On November 22, 1985, the same plaintiffs sued the same
defendants on identical allegations as contained herein. That
file was number 38432. In that action the defendants notified
the plaintiffs on June 17, 1986, that the deposition of Robert
Heidlebaugh would be taken on August 13, 1986.
This was
continued to September 9, 1986. The plaintiffs attorney could
not produce his client for a deposition. On November 4, 1986,
the defendants moved to compel the deposition or dismiss the
action. On December 16, 1986, counsel for all parties reached a
stipulation, to-wit, plaintiff, Robert Heidlebaugh would appear
for deposition on January 5, 1987, or the plaintiffs' action
would be dismissed. The deposition was not taken. On February

r

i

EB H)S -9

In the Second Judicial District Court
in and for the

County of Davis, State of Utah

* •
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Plaintiffs,
RULING ON MOTION
TO DISMISS

LEROY WEBB, et al..

1:20
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ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH, et al.,

vs.

-

Civil No. 42977

Defendants.

The defendants1 motion to dismiss came before the court for
oral argument on August 2, 1988, with Peter C. Collins appearing
for the plaintiff-5 and Robert G. Gilchrist appearing for the
defendants. After oral argument, the court took the motion under
advisement. The court now rules on the motion.
The motion to dismiss is granted.
The issue before this court is whether or not the prior
action is res judicatta.
On November 22, 1985, the same plaintiffs sued the same
defendants on identical allegations as contained herein. That
file was number 38432. In that action the defendants notified
the plaintiffs on June 17, 1986, that the deposition of Robert
Heidlebaugh would be taken on August 13, 1986.
This was
continued to September 9, 1986. The plaintiffs attorney could
not produce his client for a deposition. On November 4, 1986,
the defendants moved to compel the deposition or dismiss the
action. On December 16, 1986, counsel for all parties reached a
stipulation, to-wit, plaintiff, Robert Heidlebaugh would appear
for deposition on January 5, 1987, or the plaintiffs' action
would be dismissed. The deposition was not taken. On February

10, 1987, the court signed the order of dismissal. The order
does not specify that the dismissal is with prejudice or without
prejudice. Rule 41(b) provides:
"Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or
for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits."
This is so notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 41(a)(1). The
plaintiff's attorney stipulated to the dismissal only because he
could not produce his client for a deposition even though he had
from June, 1986, to January, 1987 to do so. The dismissal was
granted because the plaintiff would not make himself available
for a deposition. This was a dismissal for cause. It operated
as "an adjudication upon the merits."
Under the view stated above the plaintiffs are not entitled
to the benefits of Utah Code 78-12-40 which is the saving
statute.
The defendants are ordered t o draw a formal order c o n s i s t e n t
with t h i s order.
Dated August 4, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Peter C. Collins, P. 0.
Box 2668, .Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 and Robert G.
Gilchrist, P. 0. Box 2465, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 on August
4, 1988.
y
j
Deputy Clerk

EXHIBIT

"D"

CA.b .:.',:v. UTAH.
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R O B E R T G. GILCHRIST
R I C H A R D S , BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants
Key B a n k Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
Post Office Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH, et al.,
ORDER
Plaintiffs,
-vLEROY WEBB, et al.,

Civil No. 42977

Defendants.

The defendants' motion to dismiss having come on for
hearing before the court on August 2, 1988, with the plaintiffs
being represented by counsel of record Peter C. Collins, and
defendants being represented by counsel of record Robert G.
Gilchrist, and the court having heard argument, and having
reviewed the file
THAT IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that defendants* motion i?
granted. .In reaching its ruling, the court finds the following
facts:

flU©
^.v

1.

On November 22, 1985, the same plaintiffs herein

sued the same defendants herein on allegations virtually identical to those set forth in this action.
2.

In that action, Civil Number 38432, the defendants

submitted, on June 17, 1986, a notice of the deposition of
Robert Heidlebaugh to be taken on August 13, 1986.
3.

The deposition was subsequently continued by

notice to September 9, 1986.
4.

Neither plaintiff showed up.

5.

On November 4, 1986, the defendants moved the

court to compel the deposition or in the alternative to dismiss
the action.
6.

On December 16, 1986, counsel for the parties

reached a written stipulation, which required Robert Heidlebaugh
to appear for a deposition on January 5, 1987, or the plaintiffs1 action would be dismissed.
7.

The deposition of Robert Heidlebaugh was not held

on January 5, 1987.
8.

On February 10, 1987, the court signed an order

of dismissal, to which plaintiffs' counsel in that action had
signed his approval.
The court concludes that the dismissal was granted
because the plaintiff Robert Heidlebaugh did not make himself
available for a deposition (the court makes no finding on the
question of whether he or plaintiff Joyce Heidlebaugh ever
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received notice of that or any of the other deposition dates),
and that, therefore, the Complaint was dismissed for cause. A
dismissal for cause is an adjudication upon the merits. An
adjudication upon the merits does not entitle the plaintiffs
to rely on U.C.A. §78-12-40, the saving statute, to file a
second action, even though such a second action, this action,
was fil«*d in timely fashion pursuant to that statute.
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, the court hereby
orders, adjudges and decrees that the plaintiffs' Complaint,
Amended Complaint, and Second Amended Complaint, are all hereby
dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear its own costs
incurred herein.
DATED this

*C day of

_ SSi^/-

, 1988.

BY THE COURT:

/

HONORABLE DOOGLAS L. CORNAB)
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:
/"•

<x<&iO '
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Peter C. Collins
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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